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Title : Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions by Wu and Zhong
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Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions by Wu and Zhong

 Here's a paper that analyses the immediate acceptance ("Boston") algorithm that was in use in China's college admissions system in many provinces, in 2003.

Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions

by BinzhenWu and Xiaohan Zhong

Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 123, September 2020, Pages 1-21,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.007

Abstract: We examine matching inequality in students' matching outcomes for the Boston Mechanism in a large matching system, by measuring the degree of mismatch for each student. We link a student's mismatch with her reporting behavior of the first choice on her preference list to explore the reasons for matching inequality. Using administrative data from college admissions in China, we find significant gender differences, rural-urban gaps, and ethnic gaps in mismatching and first-choice behavior. These demographic differences exhibit various patterns and may be explained by risk aversion, information disadvantage, and minority-preferential admissions policies, respectively.

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