Title : EC17: the ACM conference on Economics and Computation
link : EC17: the ACM conference on Economics and Computation
EC17: the ACM conference on Economics and Computation
EC is now a long-running computer science conference (underway right now at MIT). I think the initials initially stood for Electronic Commerce, but developments in both Econ and CS have let to the initial-conserving new name, Economics and Computation.
The program is a striking demonstration of the growing intersection between Ec and CS...among the papers that catch my eye are some on fairness, pricing, matching markets, and market design generally.
Here's the program with links to abstracts:
The program is a striking demonstration of the growing intersection between Ec and CS...among the papers that catch my eye are some on fairness, pricing, matching markets, and market design generally.
Here's the program with links to abstracts:
SESSION: Plenary session
Fair Algorithms for Machine Learning
SESSION: 1a: Static Revenue Maximization 1
Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case
Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
SESSION: 1b: Peer Predictions
The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering
Forecast Aggregation
Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction
Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users
SESSION: 2a: Matching 1
The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm
Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions
Matching while Learning
Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match
SESSION: 2b: Predictions and Queries
A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games
The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete?: An Application to Human Perception of Randomness
Comparison-based Choices
Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction
SESSION: 3a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 1
The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints
Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities
Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers
Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers
SESSION: 3b: Economic Equilibrium
Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation
Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets
Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation
Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase
SESSION: 4a: Matching 2
Stable Secretaries
Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets
Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets
Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks
SESSION: 4b: Voting
Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions
Voting in the Limelight
Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness Properties
Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates
SESSION: 5a: Static Revenue Maximization 2
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract
Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments
SESSION: 5b: Information Games
Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers
Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks
Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities
Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents
SESSION: Best Paper and Best Dissertation presentations
Combinatorial Cost Sharing
SESSION: 6a: Scheduling
Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling
Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty
SESSION: 6b: Fair Division 1
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare
Controlled Dynamic Fair Division
A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting
SESSION: 7a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2
Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning
Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers
Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework
Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization
SESSION: 7b: Experiments
The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized?
Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews
Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem
Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness
SESSION: 8a: Mechanism Design -- General
Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness
From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness
SESSION: 8b: Decision Making and Learning
Planning with Multiple Biases
Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making
Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments
SESSION: 9a: Auctions -- Equilibrium
Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms
Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions
Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium
SESSION: 9b: Fair Division 2
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
Fair Public Decision Making
Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division
SESSION: Plenary session
Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive Networks
SESSION: 10a: Matching 3
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints
Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design
How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing
SESSION: 10b: Strategic Games
Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players
Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games
A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic
A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Spatio-Temporal Security Games
Thus Article EC17: the ACM conference on Economics and Computation
that is all articles EC17: the ACM conference on Economics and Computation This time, hopefully can provide benefits to all of you. Okay, see you in another article post.
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